Sweden has a remarkably egalitarian distribution of income and low rate of poverty. The living standards of the poor are closer to those of median citizens than in other advanced countries. Until the 1992-93 rise in joblessness, Sweden combined a narrow distribution of earnings and skill differentials with high employment. Wage differentials rose in Sweden when centralized bargaining weakened in the 1980s, and joblessness jumped in 1992, but the country maintained a low rate of poverty and avoided the growth of an underclass and the homelessness that developed in the United States and the United Kingdom. Indeed, so successful has been Sweden's "war on poverty" that the statistical concept of a poverty rate is not part of Swedish public discussion.
What explains Sweden's egalitarian income distribution and success in eliminating poverty? What enabled the country to pay high wages to people in the lower parts of the earnings distribution without generating a mass loss of jobs? How will changes in the welfare state and the 1992-93 economic and financial crisis affect distributional outcomes? Can Sweden maintain its record of generating equality and eliminating poverty into the twenty-first century?
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mine whether Sweden's distributional record comes from a homogeneous population or the system of income determination, section 1.2 examines how people of Swedish descent fare in the relatively unregulated American labor market and how people of non-Swedish descent fare in Sweden. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 explore supply-side and demand-side factors that potentially enabled Sweden to combine high employment and a narrow earnings distribution. Section 1.5 considers the potential consequences of market-oriented reforms in the welfare state for Sweden's elimination of poverty.
Although a large proportion of the welfare state budget goes to pensioners, we consider only the nonpensioner population, working-age adults and children. One reason we do this is that most advanced countries have greatly reduced poverty among the elderly and that Swedish outcomes here are therefore not so distinct, although in fact reduction in poverty among the elderly in Sweden exceeds that in most other countries (Coder, Rainwater, and Smeeding 1989; Kangas and Palme 1993) . A second reason is that an analysis of how the Swedish welfare state treats pensioners would lead us into complicated issues regarding the effect of state-funded pensions on savings rates, life-cycle allocations of time and income, intergenerational accounting, and so on that would greatly extend our investigation.
We reach six major conclusions: 1. Sweden achieved its egalitarian income distribution and eliminated poverty largely because of its system of earnings and income determination. In support of this conclusion, we note that the narrow income distribution in Sweden cannot be attributed to an exceptionally homogeneous population: the descendants of Swedes in the United States exhibit as much inequality and poverty as do other Americans, while people of foreign ancestry in Sweden have an income distribution comparable to those of Swedish parentage. The narrow income distribution also cannot be attributed to an exceptionally low return to skills due to market forces: Sweden has a less-educated workforce than the United States, which, all else the same, should have yielded high returns to labor skills, contrary to fact. By contrast, changes in earnings inequality in Sweden over time mirror changes in wage-setting policies, and taxes and transfers massively affect the income distribution. While a market-driven system of wage and income determination might not produce as much inequality in Sweden as in the United States, the high level of inequality found among people of Swedish descent in the United States suggests that the increase in inequality would be considerable.
2. Sweden's distinct record of labor outcomes has historically gone beyond compression of earnings differentials. Compared to other advanced European countries, what was unusual, prior to the 1992 recession, was not Sweden's low inequality in earnings but its high rate of employment. Compared to the United States, another high-employment-rate country, Sweden is distinguished by a relatively egalitarian distribution of hours of work among those employed as well as by a compressed wage structure. Indeed, the egalitarian distribution of hours of work-work sharing of sorts-contributes as much to Sweden's egalitarian earnings distribution as does its compressed distribution of hourly pay. The association of relatively egalitarian distributions of wages and hours of work may be interrelated and necessary components of the traditional Swedish economic system.
3. Tax and transfer policies contribute substantially to Sweden's overall distribution record. Factor income inequality is much greater than earnings inequality because some people are out of the job market, capital income is unequally distributed, and Sweden's income maintenance system gives considerable financial support to those who have worked but are currently not working or not working full-time. In contrast to many social welfare systems, Sweden's is largely a workfare system, with few poverty trap programs: most welfare state programs encourage work. This contrasts with American programs, which face the great difficulty of making work pay more than welfare for those eligible for benefits. In the 1980s, taxes and transfers largely offset trends toward greater inequality in factor incomes.
4. Policies and practices that equalize opportunities appear to be less important in producing Sweden's egalitarian earnings distribution than many observers would like to believe. The dispersion of years of schooling is greater in Sweden than in the United States. On standardized international tests, the distribution of scores for young Swedes is similar to the distribution of scores for young people in other advanced societies, although more compressed than in the United States, an outlier in inequality in this respect. The greater equality of parental incomes in Sweden than in the United States contributes modestly to the overall greater equality of incomes in Sweden. The implication is that policies that tend to equalize opportunities for the young do not explain much of Sweden's exceptional distribution record.
5. Part of Sweden's historic success in maintaining jobs for low-wage workers while raising their wages resulted from policies that directly or indirectly buttress the demand for low-skill workers. One important factor was the expansion of public sector employment. While the public sector does not hire disproportionate numbers of low-skill workers, it greatly increased its share of such workers from 1968 to 199 1. Another mode of buttressing demand for low-skill workers has been public subsidization of employment for the 2 percent or so of the population that is counted as disabled. We also note that Sweden pays for or subsidizes indirectly the high wages of less-skilled workers through high prices in nontraded goods and services in the private sector as well as in the public sector. Reforms that reduce those prices should put downward pressure on the wages of low-paid workers. More speculatively, we direct attention to the possible link between the compressed distribution of hours worked and the demand for low-wage labor. In some situations, mandated vacation time, extensive payment for time not worked such as parental leave, and high income taxes that discourage additional work will create demand for additional employment. Reforms that induce some Swedes, say, the more skilled, to work additional hours may reduce demand for labor for others.
6. Changes in the 1980s and early 1990s toward a more market-driven econ-omy raised inequality modestly but maintained the relative disposable income of low-income families with children. While the 1990s Swedish economic crisis put great strain on government budgets and the welfare system, Sweden's social safety net is so high that ongoing and potential future changes are unlikely to threaten its successful elimination of poverty. The child benefits program, in particular, offers a fruitful tool to offset the effects of increased inequality in factor incomes on children.
The Swedish Record
The Welfare State system (is) a major achievement of modem civilization . . . (it has) mitigated, or even eliminated destitution among people with extremely low lifetime income.
- Lindbeck (1992: 115,97) The basic fact about the Swedish income distribution that makes fans of such disparate social scientists as Assar Lindbeck and Walter Korpi is that income is more narrowly distributed and poverty lower in Sweden than in most other countries. Figure 1 .1 documents the low inequality in Sweden using data based on the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). The figure measures inequality by the ratio of household disposable income adjusted for family size' of those in the top decile of the income distribution to those in the bottom decile. Sweden, Finland, and Belgium have the lowest inequality in household incomes.z The United States has the highest inequality.
What lies behind Sweden's relatively egalitarian distribution of incomes and correspondingly high living standards for those in the bottom rungs of the distribution? Disposable income per person can be decomposed in various ways to lay bare the anatomy of the income distribution. Wages, hours worked, family composition, taxes, and transfers all affect disposable income. Since labor earnings are the prime source of personal incomes, it is natural to begin with the distribution of wages and hours worked. 
Wages and Work
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eth percentile worker to the tenth percentile worker and the ratio of the earnings of the tenth percentile worker to the median earnings. The 90/10 ratio measures the overall spread of the earnings distribution: it is our indicator of overall inequality. The 10/50 ratio measures how close the lower paid are to the median: it is our indicator of the earnings gap for the least productive and thus of relative poverty. The distribution of hourly earnings in Sweden shown in the table is narrow by American standards. The 90/10 hourly earnings ratio for men in 1991 of 2.03 is roughly one-third the 90/10 ratio found in 1989 for the United States in the Current Population Survey (5.63)! The 10/50 ratio of 0.76 contrasts with a 0.38 ratio for the United States reported in OECD (1993) . While the distribution of annual earnings in Sweden is considerably wider than the distribution of hourly earnings, this distribution is also narrow compared to the United States. The 90/10 differential in annual earnings for men of 3.09 in Sweden 1981, and 1991, the same sample, complemented with immigrants and youths to make it representative of the whole population, was interviewed again. For further details, see Erikson and Aberg (1987) . The hourly earnings variable in the LNU is constructed from questions about payment per period and about working hours. The respondent is asked in what way he or she is paid: by hour, by piece rate, by week, by month, etc. Then the survey asks for pay per hour, week, or month. Those paid by piece rate report pay per month. The hourly wage of people not paid on an hourly basis is computed by dividing monthly (or other unit) pay by normal working hours. We explain hourly earnings in n. 3 to the text. We take annual earnings from register information. We restrict the sample to people who report some earnings in both cases.
contrasts to a 10.0 differential in the United States, and the 10/50 differential of 0.51 is more than twice that in the United States (as we shall see in table 1.5).4 Contrasting the Swedish and American earnings distributions can give a misleading picture of where Sweden's distribution fits relative to those of other advanced countries. This is because, as figure 1.1 suggests, the United States is an outlier in distributional outcomes, with extraordinarily high inequality (Freeman 1994; OECD 1993) . In fact, Sweden's earnings distribution is only modestly more compressed than the distribution in most OECD countries (see fig. 1 .2). The 90/10 spread of inequality is lower in Sweden than elsewhere, but the 10/50 ratio in Sweden is comparable to those for several European countries, such as the Netherlands, Italy, and Belgium, and is only slightly greater than for Germany or Denmark. The compression of earnings in Sweden is not as extraordinary as some analyses might lead one to believe (Flanagan 1987) . Rather, what was extraordinary, at least until the rise of unemployment in 1992-93, is that Sweden combined low inequality with high levels of employment. Figure 1 .3 shows how Sweden and other advanced OECD countries stack up in these two dimensions of labor market performance. The x axis gives the 10/50 earnings ratio. The y axis gives the employrnentlpopulation rate for adults aged 15-64. Sweden lies at the far right in inequality and at the top 4. Since hourly earnings in Sweden are directly measured, while they are obtained in the United States by dividing earnings by time worked, some of the greater inequality in hourly pay in the United States could be due to measurement error. The annual eamings figures show that the basic difference remains substantial with data obtained in the same way. 1989; Norway, 1987; Portugal, 1989; Italy, 1987; Sweden, 1988 . All data relate to hourly earnings (the Netherlands gives annual figures for 1990; we have adjusted them slightly to be on a weekly basis using 1985 weekly and annual figures in OECD 11993, table 5.21). For Denmark, Norway, and Portugal, the figures refer to both sexes rather than to men only. The French data adjust the provisional figures to a definitive data basis by taking the ratio of provisional updates to definitive data in the years in which both are reported and applying this to the 1990 data. Belgium data for men give the data for the 80/10 differential ratio but give data for a 90/10 and an 80/10 differential for both sexes. We adjusted the 80/10 ratio for men by multiplying it by the ratio of the 90/10 to the 80/10 differential for both sexes. The figures differ slightly from those in Bjorklund and Freeman (1994) , which used preliminary OECD estimates. in employmentlpopulation rate. By contrast, several low-inequality European countries, such as the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Germany, had low employment rates. Some of the differences in the figure reflect differences in female labor force participation associated with the locus of "household production" activities (German and Dutch women produce comparable goods in the house as Swedish women produce in the public sector). Others can be traced to differences in the distribution of hours worked, to be described shortly. with wage-setting policies in the period. This was the era of "solidaristic wage policy," when the negotiated pay settlements reduced differentials along virtually all dimensions. By contrast, inequality widened from 1981 to 1991, as wage bargaining became increasingly decentralized. Hibbs (1990) reports a similar pattern for blue-collar LO (the Swedish Trade Union Association) workers: falling inequality from 1970 through the early 1980s, followed by an increase in inequality. The decline in the 90/10 spread from 2.44 to 1.93 in the table is substantial, but what most impresses us is the moderate change in the 10/50 gap in both the 1970s period of decreasing inequality and the 1980s period of increasing inequality. In 1968, before the push for equalization, lowdecile Swedish earners had 71 percent of median hourly earnings; in 1981, at the peak of solidaristic wage policies, these workers earned 79 percent of the median; in 1991, with more decentralized wage setting, they had 76 percent of median earnings.
Distribution of Hours Worked
Consider two economies with the same structure of wages. In economy 1, high-wage workers work many hours, while low-wage workers work few hours (possibly owing to substitution effects in labor supply behavior). In economy 2, high-and low-wage workers work the same hours over the year. Inequality of annual earnings in economy 1 will be greater than in economy 2 because the distribution of hours worked is unequal and correlated with hourly wages.5 These considerations raise the following question: does the distribution of hours worked among Swedes contribute to the country's low level of inequality in annual earnings? Table 1 .2 summarizes data on hours worked in Sweden and in the United States. The top part of the table gives the division of hours worked in the economy by employment status. Row 1 shows that hours worked per adult are moderately less in Sweden than in the United States: a gap of 0.10 In points. Row 2 shows that, while both countries have high employment/population rates, the Swedish employment rate exceeded the American rate by 0.08 In points. Hours worked per adult are higher in the United States, not because more Americans than Swedes work over the year, but because those who work put in more hours. The differential in hours worked for workers is a huge 0.19 In points. One important reason for this differential is that Swedes take at least five to six weeks vacation time (legally, as of 1993, each person has the right to five weeks, plus many public holidays) while Americans take two weeks-a threeto four-week difference that creates a .06-.08-ln-point difference in annual 5 . We avoid the term living standards here because of conceptual issues about how to value nonwork time. In one sense, measured income overstates the advantage of those who work more hours since they have less leisure. If their productivity in nonmarket activities exceeds that of lower-paid workers proportionate to wage differences, the right comparison is the comparison of wages. But, if those who work few hours do so because their opportunities are, for whatever reason, limited, the income comparison may give a better fix on differences in living standards. hours worked. Whatever the cause, rows 1-3 show that work hours are distributed more equally among adults in Sweden than in the United States. The second part of the table gives the distribution of annual hours worked among those with positive hours. The data here are hours paid for rather than hours worked and thus exceed the hours in the first part of the table. Column 1 gives data for men and women in Sweden; columns 2 and 3 contrast men in Sweden with men in the United States. The decile ratios show that hours worked are more equally distributed in Sweden than in the United States. The 90/10 spread in hours is 2.42 for both sexes and 2.43 for men in Sweden, which compares with 3.03 in the United States.
The final part of the table decomposes the variance of In annual earnings in each country into the part due to the variance in In hourly pay, the part due to the variance in hours worked, and twice their covariance. The surprising fact that emerges is that the difference in the variance of annual earnings between men in Sweden and men in the United States is due as much to the variance in annual hours as it is to the variance in In hourly pay. The implication is that there is more to the story of equalization in Sweden than compression of wage differentials: the high proportion employed and the distribution of hours among those working contributed substantially to the relatively egalitarian distribution of earnings.
Household and Disposable Incomes
Relative equalization of labor market incomes is only part of the Swedish income distribution story. The income available to individuals for consumption depends on taxes and transfers, family structure, numbers of earners and children, and the like. Sweden's welfare state tax and transfer policies greatly affect the extent to which inequality in market earnings is transformed into inequality in disposable incomes. Table 1 .3 presents information on the distribution of factor incomes: labor earnings and capital market earnings; and disposable incomes, which depend on taxes and transfers as well, for the nonelderly from 1967 through 1992. We have derived these statistics from data on household incomes and people in households as follows: we calculate incomes per equivalent person using Swedish equivalence scales;6 allocate the same income to each individual in the family; and then measure inequality among individuals of a given type, adults or ~h i l d r e n .~
In this way, we give the same weight to every person irrespective of the size of the family: a family with four people, for instance, gives four observations for the income distribution. Some may question the use of equivalence scales in income distribution measurement for adults because the adults choose the number of children, which enters their utility function. This is a valid point for adults but not for children, who do not make these choices. In any case, we have used equivalence scales for both adults and children.
We place greater stress on inequality and relative poverty among children than among adults because the welfare state presumably has a more justifiable role to play in the well-being of children. Some adults will have a low economic standard owing to their choice of hours and effort of work and will reduce hours and effort the greater the welfare benefits. Children, by contrast, create no such moral hazard problem. To the extent that low incomes during childhood adversely affect the formation of human capital, moreover, relative 6. In these scales, the first adult is counted as 1.0, the second adult as 0.65, children up to three years as 0.48, children between four and ten as 0.57; and children between eleven and seventeen as 0.65. The scales used in fig. 1 .1 above are different, and therefore the numbers are not the same.
7. Our definitions offactor income and disposable income include realized capital gains but do not capture unrealized gains, e.g., from changing real estate prices. The strongly fluctuating house prices-rising during the 1970s and the second half of the 1980s and falling during 1990-93-are therefore not taken fully into account in our data. We believe that this problem is largely in the upper half of the income distribution and thus are more confident about our relative poverty rate than our measure of overall income inequality. 1975 1978 1980" 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1989b 1990b 1991b 1992b poverty among children may have deleterious consequences for national productivity over the long run. There are four messages to be derived from the table. First, comparing the measures of inequality and relative poverty of factor incomes in table 1.3 with the comparable measures of labor market earnings in table 1.1 above, we see that factor incomes are far more unequally distributed than hourly wage rates or annual earnings. The 90/10 spreads in table 1.3 are on the order of eight or nine to one, roughly double the spreads in annual earnings in table 1.1, while the 10/50 measures of relative poverty are around 0.20, which is about half the 10/50 differentials in annual earnings. There are three reasons for this: the inclusion of people out of the labor market, who have low factor incomes; the inclusion of capital incomes, which are unequally distributed;* and the exclusion of unemployment benefits, early retirement, sick pay, and parental allowances from factor incomes even though these benefits are closely tied to previous work. In the appendix, we show that a measure of income that includes these benefits is more equally distributed than our measure of factor income.
Second, the table shows a huge difference between inequality in disposable incomes per person and in factor incomes. The 90/10 measure of inequality in disposable incomes is about a fourth as great as the comparable measure of inequality in factor incomes. Thus, inequality in disposable income is closer in magnitude to the inequality in hours earnings in table 1.1 than it is to inequality in annual earnings. For instance, in 1990, the 90/10 spread in disposable incomes per person is 2.49, which contrasts to a 4.88 spread in annual earnings and a 2.05 spread in hourly earnings. That Sweden's tax and transfer policies produce a very different distribution of disposable income than factor income is not a new finding. Lindbeck's 1983 study of the Swedish income distribution showed a "much more uneven distribution of factor income than of disposable income," which led him to conclude that "redistributive policies in Sweden must be regarded as quite successful on the basis of egalitarian values" (Lindbeck 1992, 62) . Our data confirm this conclusion.
Third, the data show two patterns of change in inequality over time. From 1967 From to 1975 , inequality in disposable incomes falls, despite increases in factor income inequality. This reflects the egalitarian policies of the period, which included high marginal taxes, a large increase in local taxes, and an extension of transfers and publicly provided services in the government budget. Consistent with this, Gustafsson and Uusitalo (1990) show a large increase in the redistributive effects of public transfers over the same period. The second pattern is an upward trend in factor income inequality from the late 1980s through 1991, followed by an even sharper jump in 1992, presumably due to the increase in ~nemployment.~ This has, however, only a modest effect on disposable income inequality. Whereas from 1989 to 1992 the 90/10 differential in factor incomes nearly doubled, the 90/10 differential in disposable incomes increased by just 6 percent. Factor income inequality was three times as great in 1991 as in 1967, but disposable income inequality was less! Swedish tax and transfer policies prevented the trend toward increased factor income inequality from widening the distribution of disposable incomes, even in 1992, when unemployment rose substantially.
8. In part, 1991 appears to be an exceptional year because many people changed the timing of their incomes to take advantage of the tax reforms; for further evidence, see Bjorklund, Palme, and Svensson (1995) .
9. But we show in the appendix that inequality of income from work and total income was more stable than inequality of factor incomes in total until 1990. Likely explanations for these diverging trends in the 1980s are rising early retirement and sickness pay. In 1991, inequality of income from work rose substantially.
The fourth result is that tax and transfer policies acted to equalize disposable income between children and reduce the relative poverty among them. The 101 50 ratio in column 8 is nearly constant at about two-thirds the median throughout the period covered in the table-despite rising inequality and relative poverty per person in factor incomes among families with children, as among all families. The major transfer policies here are child allowances and parental leave. During the 1980s, child allowances were raised in real terms and a progressive component introduced, which gives extra amounts for the third and next children. Both the increased amount and greater progressivity of the transfers for larger families have equalizing effects on the distribution of disposable incomes among children. The 1991 increase in child allowances that was part of the tax reform of that year explains why the relative poverty rate of children did not increase from 1990 to 1991 despite the increased relative poverty for people in terms of factor incomes in that period.
For comparison, we estimated income per person in families with children in the United States in 1989, using the Swedish equivalence scales to adjust for family size. The resulting distribution of income per person showed a much wider distribution of income among children than in Sweden. In the United States, the income of children in the bottom decile of the distribution of per person income associated with children was 33 percent of the median of that distribution.I0 Over time, child poverty rates rose from 14.2 percent in 1973 to 19.9 percent in 1990 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993, table 718), as earnings differentials widened and Aid to Families with Dependent Children fell in real terms.
These findings are consistent with previous research on the distribution of income among children in Sweden. Analyses based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study show that in the 1980s Sweden was particularly successful in generating equality and reducing poverty among children (Coder, Rainwater, and Smeeding 1989) . Jantti and Danziger (1994) find that Sweden's tax and transfer system eliminated relative poverty (defined as 40 percent of the median income in their study) among children, in contrast to the modest effects of American transfer policies. Poverty among children with single parents is rare in Sweden, both because of high labor force participation among single mothers and because of the transfer system. What is new in table 1.3 is the evidence that Sweden's redistributive system maintained the relative income of these families in the early 1990s, when factor income inequality began to increase.
Should one view the divergence between factor income inequality and dis-10. In this calculation, we include reported transfers but do not adjust for taxes. Taking account of taxes will have little effect on the difference in income between the tenth decile and the median, but US. household surveys typically understate the amount of transfer income relative to administrative records and also understate the amount of capital income. We believe that the 33 percent figure that we calculated is probably lower than the actual figure. posable income inequality in table 1.3 as a good thing or as a bad thing? On the plus side, the divergence shows the efficacy of Swedish transfer and tax policies in buffering low-income citizens against a market trend toward a decline in their relative economic position-which is what a social welfare scheme focused on relative well-being is supposed to do. On the minus side, by breaking the link from market earnings to disposable income, such a redistributive system adversely affects work incentives, as Lindbeck has stressed in his critical assessment of the welfare state. And as the gap between factor income inequality and disposable income inequality grows, as it did in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the necessary transfers also have to rise, adversely affecting government budgets and increasing deadweight losses from tax or deficit financing.
I .4 The Transfer Programs
What are the transfer programs that so greatly affected the distribution of disposable income in Sweden? There are many such programs, each of which merits detailed analysis beyond the scope of our study. We distinguish three types of programs according to their relation to work:
Poverty Trap Programs. These are programs that are antithetical to work in that they go to people who are not working or who earn below a certain amount, require no previous work for eligibility, and are reduced or lost if the person gets a job or increases market earnings. The archetype is a means-tested benefit.
Workfare Programs. These are programs that increase the incentive to work because only people who work can use them but that can have negative effects on hours worked when the person attains eligibility. An example is the subsidized child-care program that is limited to families where parents work at least half-time. Other workfare transfer programs give money to workers who are not working but who had to work previously to be eligible-work injury insurance, sickness cash benefits, and parental leave payment.
Income Effect Programs. These are programs that have an income effect on working by providing money regardless of work activity. An example is the child allowance program, which goes to anyone who fits the criterion regardless of work activity. Table 1 .4 gives expenditures on the major transfer programs classified under these three headings. Medical care is practically free to all citizens and is one of the largest transfer programs, with expenditures (exclusive of pensioners) of 2.6 percent of GNP. It is financed out of general taxes and not counted as part of personal income. While individuals pay for part of dental care through gEstimated as the number of children at day-care centers (300,000, according to Statistics Sweden) times SKr 50,OOO plus the number of children with subsidized day care in private homes (1 10,000, according to Statistics Sweden) times SKr 40,000. "From Social Insurance statistics, with the part paid by noncustcdial parents excluded. Sickness cash benefits, work injury insurance, disability pension, training stipends, wages for sheltered jobs and temporary jobs, unemployment benefits, parental leave benefits, and temporary parents' cash benefits are subject to income tax. Thus, gross expenditures overstates the net burden of public budgets. fees, some dental expenses are subsidized, accounting for an additional 0.4 percent of GNP. The public expenditure on medical care creates an income effect on the labor supply decision.
Sickness cash benefits and work injury insurance are work-related transfers since eligibility requires a previous period of work. Both programs replace a constant fraction of previous earnings up to a limit, which is exceeded by less than 10 percent of all workers. The replacement rate for sickness benefits was 90 percent until it was reduced in early 1991. The replacement rate for the work injury insurance has been similar to that for sickness. Together, the two programs cost 3.0 percent of GNP.
The ultimate safety net is means-tested social assistance. This is a poverty trap program, although the social authorities require that the benefit-recipient actively seek work at the employment office and accept suitable jobs. In 1991, 0.4 percent of GNP was spent on social assistance. Another means-tested transfer, of about equal magnitude, is the housing allowance, which is determined by the income of the family, the wealth, the rent, and the number of children."
We next turn to the programs designed for certain groups. The disability pension amounts to 1.9 percent of GNP. Most disability pensions are given for medical reasons, even though workers above sixty years of age can be granted such for labor market reasons. We describe the program as a poverty trap because disability pensions are purportedly sensitive to regional or cyclic labor market conditions. Still, many persons with disability pensions have such severe medical problems that the work disincentive of the disability pension will have no effect on behavior. Active labor market measures that provide jobs, training, and rehabilitation for the disabled are workfare programs, by our definition. The expenditure on these measures is 0.8 percent of GNP. Around 2 percent of the workforce is employed with some form of subsidy for disability.
The policies for the unemployed consist of "passive" benefits and active measures that provide jobs, training, and employment service. Unemployment benefits have a work disincentive effect, but this is counteracted by temporary jobs and training slots offered to the unemployed at employment offices. A benefit claimant who refuses to accept such jobs (or other jobs) can be denied further unemployment benefits (see Bjorklund and Holmlund 1991) .
Programs for families with children are extensive. They are designed to stimulate work by both parents. The day-care system, which covers the majority of children, is a workfare program that encourages both parents to work since both must work (or study) to qualify for day-care slots. Parents pay a fee for the child, but 80-90 percent of the costs are subsidized. Most local authorities set lower fees for the second and third child of the same family and for single parents. The child allowance (paid to the mother) is, as noted, an income effect program. The parental leave program offers benefits at the level of the 11. We ignore the subsidies that cover the costs of the interest payments on housing and the implicit subsidy in the deductibility of interest payments. sickness benefit for a year for parents who have a work history and much lower support for parents who have not worked before the birth of the child and thus counts as workfare.'* There is also a temporary parents' cash benefit paid to parents who stay home to care for sick children or for visits to the child's day care or school. This is designed to facilitate parents combining work with parenting. Finally, there is a maintenance allowance paid by the government if the noncustodial parent does not meet his obligations. This program costs the government around 0.2 percent of GNP.
All told, table 1.4 shows that 16 percent of GNP is spent on the listed programs. Nearly half the listed expenditures are workfare programs, a bit over a quarter are for programs that have an income effect on work, and a quarter are for programs that have a poverty trap component. What is impressive is that so much of the Swedish welfare system is work based.
What an Egalitarian Income Distribution Means
How does Sweden's distributional record translate into the economic lives of people? To answer this question, we contrast the living standards of someone in the tenth percentile of the earningshcome distribution in Sweden with a comparable person in the United States. To compare Swedish and American incomes, we use the purchasing power parity statistics of the OECD for 1990 rather than highly volatile exchange rates. In 1990, real gross domestic product per head was 26 percent higher in the United States than in Sweden (OECD 1990, 27) , with the result that on average Americans had a higher living standard than Swedes. To estimate how well low-decile Swedish and American men fared, we have calculated the 1991 hourly pay in Swedish kronor of a tenth-percentile Swedish man, and then adjusted this pay for the greater inequality in pay in the United States and for the difference in overall living standards, to see how much tenth-percentile American men would make in krona purchasing power units. The results, shown in figure 1.4a, indicate that, because of the narrower distributions of pretax earnings in Sweden, bottomdecile Swedish workers earned SKr 62.00 per hour in 1991-59 percent more than the SKr 39.00 per hour that a bottom-decile American worker was paid in that year!I3 Similarly, we have estimated the 1990 income (adjusted for OECD equivalence scales) of Swedish adults, twenty to sixty-four, and of children, through seventeen years of age, and then adjusted these incomes for the greater inequality in the United States and the higher living standard. Hourly pay. Sweden, our calculation from LNU for male workers. United States, estimated from data in OECD (1993) as follows: Table 5 .2 shows that the hourly pay of a tenth-percentile American worker was 0.38 of the U.S. median in 1989 whereas the hourly pay of a tenth-percentile Swedish worker was 0.76 of the median in the same year. We multiply the SKr 62.00 by .38/.76 to obtain the earnings that a tenth-percentile American would have if Sweden had the U.S. earnings distribution. Then we multiply this figure by 1.26 to account for the higher overall income per capita in America as shown in the GDP per capita figures.
Disposable income of adults, twenty to sixty-four Sweden, our calculation from LNU based on the OECD equivalence scales. U.S., estimated from calculations based on the Luxembourg Income Survey done by Markus Jintti. These calculations show that in 1986 the tenth-percentile adult had disposable income, adjusted for the OECD equivalence scales, that was 0.34 of the median in the United States compared to 0.64 in Sweden. We multiply the SKr 98,700 in Sweden by .34/.64 to obtain the disposable income that a tenth-percentile American adult would have if Sweden had the U.S. income distribution, then multiply by 1.26 to account for the higher overall income in the United States.
Disposable income of children, through age seventeen. Sweden, our calculations from LNU based on the OECD equivalence scales. United States, estimated from calculations based on the Luxembourg Income Survey done by Markus Jantti. These calculations show that in 1986 the tenth-percentile child had disposable income, adjusted for the OECD equivalence scales, that was 0.33 of the median in the United States compared to 0.59 in Sweden. We multiply the SKr 55,600 in Sweden by .33/.59 to obtain the disposable income that a tenth-percentile American child would have if Sweden had the U.S. income distribution, then multiply by 1.26 to account for the higher overall income in the United States. Nore: Similar results are obtained if we use other estimated income distribution figures. According to Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995, table 4 . I), a low-decile person in Sweden had disposable income that was 0.56 of the median in 1987, whereas a low-decile person in the United States had disposable income that was 0.35 of the median.
shows that low-decile adults in Sweden had disposable incomes exceeding those of low-decile adults in the United States by 50 percent and that low-decile children in Sweden had disposable incomes exceeding those of low-decile children in the United States by 42 percent. The greater component of public consumption in Sweden than in the United States and the likelihood that public consumption is more equally distributed than private consumption suggests that even these contrasts understate the difference in living standards of adults and children in the lower part of the Swedish and American income distributions.
The elimination of poverty among people low in the income distribution in Sweden compared to the poverty among people low in the income distribution in the wealthier United States is a major social achievement, per the Lindbeck quote with which we introduced this section.
System or Swedes?
Comparisons of Sweden and the United States are misleading. Sweden is a small country with a homogeneous population. US.-Swedish differences reflect the greater heterogeneity of Americans. Shouldn't Sweden be compared to Minnesota rather than to the United States as a whole?
-A Critic
To deal with this criticism, we have developed a more refined counterfactual to assess the effects of Sweden's supposedly homogeneous population as opposed to its income determination system on distributional outcomes. Our ideal counterfactual experiment would be to move a random sample of Swedes to the United States (and Americans to Sweden) and to contrast the distribution of their incomes after some time with that of peers back home. Such an experiment would eliminate population homogeneity as a cause of differences in distributions and isolate the effect of skill formation, wage setting, taxes, and transfers. The closest we can come to this ideal with existing data is to contrast the income of people of Swedish descent in the United States with that of people in Sweden and the income in Sweden of Swedes with nowSwedish ancestry with that of Swedes with Swedish-born parents.
To identify people of Swedish background in the United States for our test of "system versus Swedes," we used the ancestry question in the 1990 U.S. Census of Population. In 1990, the question was, "What is this person's ancestry or ethnic origin?' The coding allows people to report two ancestry groups ( e g , German-Irish). If people gave Swedish and a second group as their ancestry, we categorized them as being of partial Swedish descent; if they gave only Swedish as their ancestry, we categorized them as being of full Swedish descent.14 The 1990 census contains the records of 53,468 men of Swedish ances- We cannot do the counterfactual of how the descendants of American immigrants fare in Sweden: there are too few such people. We can, however, examine how adults born of all immigrants fare in Sweden. Contrary to the image of homogeneous Sweden, in 1991 in the LNU survey, 15 percent of Swedish residents aged twenty to sixty-four reported that one or two of their parents were not Swedish citizens at birth: roughly three-quarters of these people reported that the language spoken at home was something other than Swedish; and half said it was a non-Nordic language. In the 1970s and 1980s, the fraction of the Swedish population with immigrant background roughly doubled: in 1974, 8.1 percent of Swedes aged twenty to sixty-four had at least one nonSwedish parent, whereas, in 1991, 15.1 percent reported having at least one non-Swedish parent. We tabulated the hourly earnings distribution for all adults twenty to sixty-four who reported that at least one parent was not Swedish at birth (row 5 in table 1.5) and for the subset who reported that the lanSwedish ancestry. There are too few Swedish immigrants to the United States in recent years to give a reasonable comparison in any case.
15. We performed a similar analysis using the 1980 U.S. census, which coded for only a single ancestry group and obtained results like those in the table. Thus, our findings do not hinge on a particular census year.
16. There are possible selectivity problems for people of Swedish descent in the United States owing to the selectivity of their ancestors, but we doubt that this substantively affects the results. If there is a selectivity problem, it is likely that Swedes in the United States come from a more homogeneous background than Swedes in Sweden. This is because economic analysis suggests that immigrants should be drawn from similar circumstances: the top or bottom of an income distribution rather than randomly. Their descendants might have similar (although presumably much smaller) selectivity.
17. A possible problem with our contrast is that measurement error in incomes may be much larger in the U.S. data than in the Swedish data. The U.S. figures are self-reported, while the Swedish earnings data are from administrative records. But, while this might exaggerate the difference in inequality between the United States and Sweden in general, there is no reason to expect it to affect the comparison of incomes of Americans of Swedish descent with that of other Americans. And it is the absence of any discernible difference between the distributions of those two groups that is the key finding in the table. guage spoken at home was neither Swedish nor another Nordic tongue (row 6 in table 1.5). For both groups, the 90/10 and 10/50 ratios of earnings are comparable to those for people with parents born in Sweden.I8 The Swedish system of wage determination produces a dispersion of earnings among those with foreign parentage that is comparable to that of other Swedes, although annual earnings are somewhat more unequally distributed among immigrants than among the native born. We conclude that the compressed income distribution in Sweden comes, not from some inherent homogeneity of Swedes, but rather from the Swedish system of determining skills and productivity and the wages and income rewards associated with such. This conclusion leads us naturally to the question of what that system actually does to compress incomes and eliminate poverty.
The Supply Side of the Swedish System
We use a supply-demand framework to examine how Sweden combined low wage inequality and a high employment rate for so many years. Our main con-18. Despite the fact that people of foreign ancestry earn less than others when a foreign language is spoken at home. We regressed in In hourly earnings of men on dummy variables for their ancestry in Sweden and obtained the following coefficients and standard errors: for any parent not Swedish at birth, ,060 (.037); for parent not Swedish and other Nordic language spoken at home, -.I47 (.051); for parent not Swedish and non-Nordic language spoken at home, -.248 (.047). trast is with the high-employmenthigh-inequality United States, although we occasionally consider low-employmenflow-inequality EEC countries as well.
An Egalitarian Skill Distribution?
There are two basic ways in which Swedish practices might produce an egalitarian distribution of skills that supports a compressed wage structure: through egalitarian family incomes, which should act to reduce inequality in human capital formation at home; and through an egalitarian distribution of day-care and public school resources. To see how these factors might affect outcomes, consider a production function that relates the market skills of young people to various background resources:
(1) skill of young = f (family resources; public resources; genetics; random factors).
Equation (1 ) represents the transmission and augmentation of skills across generations as a simple reduced form linking resources to outcomes. We use it to examine the likely effects of the distribution of resources in one generation on the distribution of skills in the next. We have already seen that, in terms of disposable income among children, family resources are relatively equally distributed in Sweden. Children living with only one parent also fare reasonably well in terms of income (Jantti and Danziger 1994) , in contrast to the high poverty rates for them in the United States. A skeptic might, however, argue that equalization of disposable income has contributed to the breaking down of the nuclear family, with deleterious consequences for children. We find it difficult to give much credence to this claim, for the basic reason that the Swedish record in family composition is "normal. Moreover, for Sweden, at least the most important change in family conditions over time has been an improvement in the economic conditions of families with children rather than an increase in single-parent families. This evidence comes from three questions about conditions during childhood in the Level of Living Surveys for different cohorts: whether individuals grew up with both biological parents (until age sixteen); whether their family had "economic difficulties" when they were growing up; and whether their family had "family conflicts." The results, summarized in figure 1.5, show a decline in the proportion brought up with both biological parents, from 85 percent for those born in the late 1890s through the 1960s to around 80 percent afterward; an upward shift in the proportion reporting family conflicts; and, most striking, a drop in the proportion reporting economic difficulties, from around 40 percent for the earliest cohort to less than 10 percent for those born from 1950 to the 1970s. There is evidence, moreover, that these childhood conditions affect adult outcomes: Lundberg (1993) found that adverse outcomes on all three childhood conditions variables have adverse effects on physical and mental health in adulthood, controlling for the social class of the father.
Public resources that are most likely to affect skill formation among the young are also relatively equally distributed in Sweden. The public day-care (or preschool) system (dugis) for children from one to seven years old contributes to equal conditions during childhood. This system, run by the local governments, was built up in the 1970s and 1980s. It offers highly subsidized places for children when both parents work (or study) at least part-time. In addition, the social authorities can place children with problems or from families with problems at the centers. Special resources are available for children with physical or social problems. Since the "graduates" of the day-care system have not yet entered the labor force in large numbers, we do not know how the system affects job performance. But two studies based on different (but rather small) data sets have found that children who participate have higher cognitive performance and are more likely to choose the academic track in high school than nonparticipant children with similar parental background (Andersson 1989; Jonsson 1994) .
School resources are also relatively equally distributed. Private schools are rare; and public resources are allocated so that, as Swedes say, "the size of the parents' wallet shall not influence the school quality of the child." National tests are given to check that all schools meet certain standards. Special resources are geared toward the least-able pupils. An egalitarian attitude toward allocation of school resources is shared across the political spectrum. It is also embodied in proposed voucher systems designed to allow parents greater choice in schooling. Swedish voucher plans restrict the ways in which parents can "top up" vouchers with private spending.
Has the relatively egalitarian distribution of family or public resources been important in Sweden's attaining egalitarian labor market outcomes? Our answer, derived from crude measures of the distribution of skills and estimates of the effect of family background on labor market outcomes, is, surprisingly, that these are not major factors in Sweden's distributional record.
Consider first the distribution of the simplest indicator of human capital, years of schooling. In an In earnings equation, the variance of In earnings depends on the variance of schooling, the variance of returns to schooling, and their covariance. If Swedish wage compression rested primarily on a compression of skills, one might expect an especially small variance in years of schooling. But, in fact, the dispersion of years attained in Sweden is greater than in the United States. Our calculations produce a variance of years attained in Sweden of 12.25 for those aged twenty-five to sixty-four in the LNU survey. The variance of years attained in the United States was 8.96 for men in the same age group.'9 19. The greater dispersion in years of schooling in Sweden than in the United States is also found in measures of relative variation: the coefficient of variation of years attained in Sweden is 0.33, compared to 0.23 in the United States. .
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Source: Calculated from IEA (1988, tables 5 and 6). Notes; "%" refers to the relevant percentile, so, e.g., "75%' means "seventy-fifth percentile." The twenty-fifth percentile of the bottom twenty-fifth percentile is approximately the bottom six percent of students.
Years completed is, to be sure, a crude measure of the resources spent on schooling, much less of human capital formed in that process. In the United States, there is huge variation in the quality of schooling among schools and in achievement scores across (as well as within) schools. In some school districts, some high school graduates may be nearly illiterate. The evidence shows that Sweden has a relatively egalitarian expenditure on nonuniversity schooling. Variation in test scores across Swedish schools is much less than the vanation of test scores across American schools or across the schools in many other countries.*O But the equalization of school spending and of test scores among schools (as well as the equalization of other public resources and of disposable incomes) has not produced a particularly narrow distribution of achievement scores among Swedish students, according to test scores from the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). Table 1 .6 presents IEA statistics on the science achievement of fourteen-year-old stu-20. Table 7 in IEA (1988) shows that, among developed countries, Sweden, Finland, Japan, and Norway have the lowest variation in achievement scores across schools and the United States, Italy, and the Netherlands the highest. The coefficient of variation in the average score of schools for the United States is .18, which is twice the Swedish coefficient of variation, .09. The ratio of the maximum school score to the minimum school score in the United States is 3.07, compared to a ratio of 1.67 in Sweden. dents. Columns 1-5 give the quartile scores in Sweden, the United States, and other countries included in the 1988 study. These columns also give the mean score of the bottom quartile and the bottom quartile of the bottom quartile (roughly the lowest 6 percent of students). Columns 6 and 7 give ratios of test scores for the seventy-fifth percentile student to the twenty-fifth percentile student and of the scores for the twenty-fifth percentile to the median. To facilitate comparisons, we give the average of the scores for all advanced OECD countries save Sweden and the United States as well as the scores for each country. The table shows that fourteen-year-old students have a more narrow distribution of science scores in Sweden than in the United States but that the distribution of scores among Swedish students is normal. In each statistic, Sweden has just about the average for all the countries, whereas the United States evinces greater dispersion.
While scores on school achievement tests are far from ideal measures of the dispersion in "economic ability" that presumably contributes to earnings inequality, the distributions in the table lend no support to the notion that, by equalizing opportunities among children, Sweden greatly eased the path of equalizing outcomes in the labor market.
The Role of Family Background
Consider next the possible effect of Sweden's compression of family income differences on the economic outcomes of children, as captured in a simple relation linking sons' earnings (Y) to fathers' earnings ( X ) :
Taking variances yields a relation between variation in backgrounds and the b coefficient to earnings inequality: The variance of the In earnings of fathers in Sweden in the LNU ranges from 0.24 to 0.32 over the period 1967-73, for an average of 0.29 (Bjorklund and Jantti 1993, table 1) . This compares to variances in the U.S. Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) in 1967-71 that range from 0.34 to 0.76, for an average of 0.50 (a much smaller variance than the census-based estimate in table 1.5 for all U.S. men). Given an estimate of b, we can readily calculate how much earnings inequality would rise in Sweden or fall in the United States if Swedes and Americans had the same dispersion of fathers' earnings. To estimate b, we rely on correlations between fathers' and sons' earnings in the two countries from Bjorklund and Jantti. They obtain father-son correlations for the United States (based on different years and estimating techniques) that cluster around 0.40, compared to correlations for Sweden of about 0.25 (Bjorklund and Jantti 1993, 18) . This finding can be interpreted as higher social mobility in Sweden than in the United States.
We combine these estimates in table 1.7 to assess how much the difference in turn give us the estimated contribution of the variation in fathers' earnings to sons' earnings in row 5 and, by subtraction, the residual variance in row 6. The difference in residual variances of 0.15 is 7 1 percent of the difference in initial variances, implying that at most 29 percent of the gap in variances could be due to this background factor. Rows 7-9 record the variance in earnings that would be found in Sweden or the United States under the counterfactuals that each country had the other's variance in fathers' earnings but its own intergenerational earnings correlation and that each had the other's intergenerational correlation but its own variance in fathers' earnings. These calculations show that giving each group the other's variance in fathers' earnings has a relatively modest effect on the final vari- The lower father-son earnings correlation in Sweden than in the United States in the table is open to alternative interpretations. A human capital interpretation might be that Sweden's higher provision of social goods and use of day-care facilities for children reduce the contribution of family in the production of children's human capital. Another interpretation would be that the smaller effect of fathers' income on earnings is part of Sweden's compression of wages, which reduces the effects of skill on earnings, including skills obtained from parents. Yet another interpretation would be that Sweden has been more successful in equalizing opportunities.
However one interprets the difference in intergenerational income mobility, table 1.7 shows that equalization of parental earnings produces only limited equalization of outcomes. Equalization of background or opportunities is not sufficient to give the narrow distribution of earnings observed in Sweden. Producing an egalitarian earnings distribution requires direct intervention in the income determination process.
Demand-Side Contributions
Who demands less-able workers in Sweden at relatively high pay? What programs or policies augment the demand for these workers?
The Public Sector
One widely mentioned possibility is that the public sector operates as an employer of last resort, hiring people who could not obtain comparable-paying 21. We explain .06 points of the .21-point difference. The .06 is the difference between rows 1 and 9. jobs in the private sector. To explore this hypothesis, we tabulated the proportion of workers employed in the public sector from the Level of Living Surveys of 1968, 1974, 1981, and 1991 , categorizing level of skill in three ways. First, we use low education, specifically, whether individuals aged forty-five and older at most completed thefokkolu (which means that they have six or seven years of schooling), as an indicator of low
In 1968, roughly one-third of the population of older workers were in this category, but, in 1991, just about 15 percent or so had so little schooling. Thus, the extent to which the group is low-skilled increases over time. Second, we use the quartile distribution of workers by their wages. We use quartiles rather than deciles for reasons of sample size. Third, we use the health status of individuals based on their self-reported mobility from three questions: "Can you walk 100 meters relatively quickly without trouble?' "Can you run 100 meters without much trouble?' and "Can you walk up and down stairs without trouble?' We classify respondents who answer yes to all questions as having normal mobility; those who answer no to one or two questions as having reduced mobility; and those who answer no to all three as having severely limited mobility. Approximately 10-15 percent of the population report some mobility restriction, with the fraction declining over time. Table 1 .8 shows the proportion of workers in these groups working in the public sector. The percentage of less-educated older workers employed in the public sector tends to be below the percentage of all workers in the public sector, especially for men. Men with earnings in the low quartile are also no more likely to be in the public sector than men elsewhere in the earnings distribution in 1991 and less likely to be in the public sector in other years. Women with low-quartile earnings are less likely than other women workers to be in the public sector in all years. As for those with low physical mobility, in 198 1 and 1991, individuals with reduced mobility are no more likely to work for the public sector than other workers. Women with severely limited mobility were, however, more likely to be public sector workers in those two years, as are men with severely limited skills in 1991. However, interpreting these figures, note that the employers of the 2 percent or so of the labor force that is handicapped or disabled receive special subsidies; about half are employed in sheltered workshops in a government-run corporation (Samhall) and half at other work sites whose wages the state subsidizes in part. Samhall is part of the public sector, and the figures for those with severely limited mobility may reflect this fact.
That low-skill workers are no more likely to be employed in the public sector in 1991 than other workers does not, however, mean that public sector employment has not buttressed demand for them. The pattern in most countries is 22. For most cohorts born after 1950, at least nine years of schooling was compulsory. Therefore, the group that we identify is an absolutely and relatively low-skilled group over the entire period. for low-skill workers to be underrepresented in the public sector, and finding equal representation is therefore surprising. As the last column in table 1.8 shows, moreover, the proportion of low-skill workers in the public sector increased from 1968 to 1991. We interpret the upward trend and their proportionate representation in Sweden as signs that the public sector has, indeed, been a greater demander of their labor than in other countries.
The Disabled or Handicapped
Handicapped or disabled workers are likely to have lower productivity than other workers, and in many countries these workers are among the poorest. In Sweden, they have relatively normal incomes. Determining how Sweden does this provides an important insight into the Swedish workfare system and clues into the way the Swedish system treats other, less clearly defined, lowproductivity groups.
Sweden seeks to get the disabled jobs at wages above their marginal product. As noted, Samhall employs a substantial proportion of these workers; it pays the normal rate for a job and receives half of its budget from the state rather than from the sales of goods. In normal years, about half the budget of the Swedish Labor Market Board is spent on the employment of disabledhandicapped workers. Table 1 .9 records the work time of people in Sweden with differing levels of disability, as measured by responses to the questions on mobility in 1981 and 1991. A high proportion of people with reduced or severely limited mobility work, with relatively high contracted hours: only 5 percent or so below the hours worked by persons with normal mobility. This implies that short working hours have not enabled the disabled to get jobs in Sweden. However, in table 1.9, the panel C data on sickness days show that those with reduced or severely limited mobility take many more sickness days than othersthree to five times as much among men and two to three times as much among women.
Figures on sick days display the two sides of a welfare state that makes benefits contingent on working. On the one side, the sickness pay program maintains the incomes of those who suffer disabilities. On the other side, the program gives workers disincentive to work once they have a job. Take the disincentive effect first, as economists often do. If we assume that the typical full-time Swedish worker takes five weeks of vacation and two weeks of holiday, he or she would work forty-five weeks a year. The figures for people with normal mobility show that, in 1981, they took an additional three weeks of sickness time, giving forty-two weeks of actual time worked in a year (which As there is no reason to believe that Swedes are more sickly than non-Swedes (expected life spans would suggest the opposite, and occupational illness is, if anything, lower in Sweden than in other countries [OECD 1989a, chap, 4] ), we interpret this as reflecting economic responsiveness to incentives. Under the prereform Swedish sick-leave system, sick time was paid exclusively by the government, so neither workers nor firms had an incentive to minimize sick time. Indeed, the opposite was probably true in many situations. Just as seasonal employers in the United States and their prospective workers know that part of the job involves several months of unemployment insurance during the off season, Swedish employers may have found that implicitly approving that workers exploit the sick-time system made their workplace more attractive to employees. To see the redistributive part of Swedish sickness pay policy, assume that the difference in sickness days between workers with reduced or severely limited mobility and those with normal mobility is in fact due to physical problems. Men with limited mobility take roughly nine weeks of sickness leave beyond what men with normal mobility take, working just thirty-three weeks over the year or 21 percent less than men with normal mobility. Does this produce a 21 percent or so difference in annual earnings or a large difference in hourly earnings? To answer this question, we regressed the In hourly earnings and In annual earnings of Swedish workers on age, age squared, years of schooling, and dummy variables for mobility status in 1981. We estimate that the hourly earnings of men with reduced mobility were just -.06 In points lower than those of men with normal mobility, with a standard error of .04; similarly, we estimate that the hourly earnings of men with severely limited mobility were just -.02, with a standard error of .04. For annual earnings, we found no difference by mobility status: the regression coefficients (standard errors) were .02 (.09) for severely limited mobility and .OO (.07) for those with reduced mobility.
Save for the fact that women work fewer hours on average because they are more likely to work part-time than men, results for women are the same. In 1991, the typical female worker contracted for forty-two weeks of full-time work (= 1,680/40); in 1981, she worked 37.3 weeks (= 1,490/40). Assuming that she took five weeks of vacation time and two weeks of holiday time, she worked 30.3 weeks in 1981. Table 1 .9 shows that she also took 3.5 weeks of sickness days; therefore, she worked about twenty-seven weeks full-time over the year. The woman with reduced mobility worked about five weeks less than this (twenty-two weeks), whereas the woman with severely limited mobility worked nearly ten weeks less (seventeen weeks of full-time labor). Thus, those with less than normal mobility worked 19-37 percent less than women with normal mobility. But neither the hourly wages nor the annual earnings of women with mobility limitations were lower than those of women without mobility limitations.
Our results are not peculiar to the LNU survey or our definitions of work disability: Wadensjo (1984, table 14.6) reports similar results in the 1978 Living Conditions Survey. At a cost of excessive use of sickness days by nondisabled workers, Sweden's sickness pay system has kept disabledhandicapped workers close to the median of the annual earnings distribution.
By contrast, consider how workers who are handicapped or disabled fare in the United States. For this purpose, we use the 1990 U.S. Census of Population, which asks workers the following:
Because of a health condition that has lasted for 6 or more months, does this person have any difficultya. going outside the home alone, for example, to shop or visit a doctor's office?
b. taking care of his or her own personal needs, such as bathing, dressing, or getting around inside the home?
In addition, the U.S. census asked:
Did this person have a physical, mental, or other health condition that a. limits the kind or amount of work this person can do at a job? b. prevents this person from working at a job? lasted for 6 or more months and whichTo parallel the Swedish mobility questions, we defined disabled workers in three ways. Our first group of disabled workers consists of those who answered yes to any healtkdphysical condition question. Twelve percent of U.S. men aged twenty to sixty-four answered yes at least once. This compares to 11 percent of the Swedish men whom we categorized as having some mobility limitation. Our second group consists of those who answered yes to at least two of these healtWphysica1 questions; this is comparable to our definition in the Swedish data of individuals who are severely limited, and in fact 3 percent of U.S. men were in this category, just as 3 percent of Swedish men were in the comparable category. Our third group consists of men who answered yes only once to the three questions; this is comparable to our definition in the Swedish data of persons having reduced mobility.
The U.S. data show that, in the United States, work disability has a massive adverse effect on whether the worker was employed in the survey week.23 Workers with no disability had an 85 percent employment rate (which compares to the 90 percent rate in Sweden), but those with at least some disability had a 45 percent employment rate (which compares to 68 percent in Sweden).
23. Our subsample from the census had 138,531 observations, and therefore all the differences among groups are highly statistically significant.
Only 22 percent of the men who answered yes two or more times to the disability questions worked (which compares to 63 percent in Sweden). To see how the disabled fared in terms of earnings, we regressed the In hourly earnings and In annual earnings of American men on age, age squared, years of schooling,24 and dummy variables for disability status and obtained huge negative coefficients and small standard errors. We estimate that the hourly earnings of men with some disability was -.16 (standard error .0l) In points lower than for men with normal mobility and that the annual earnings of men with some disability was -.49 (standard error .01) In points lower than for men with normal mobility.
1.4.3
If low-skill workers are paid more in Sweden than they would be paid in a more market-driven system of wage setting, someone must foot the bill for the higher wages of those workers. In the case of the disabled, it is clear that the rest of society pays by subsidizing their employers or their sickness days. Might something similar be true of other low-skill workers? Does Sweden "pay" for its egalitarian wage policies and full employment through higher prices for the goods produced by the less skilled?
In traded goods, where the price of the commodity is given on world markets, it is presumably not possible to shift the cost of higher wages for the less skilled to consumers. In nontraded goods and services, however, a large share of the increased wages for the less skilled may very well be borne by consumers. If this were the case, we would expect the prices of commodities or services produced by low-wage workers to be relatively higher in Sweden than in the United States, which does not have a compressed wage structure. By contrast, if the compressed wage structure was due solely to a compressed skill distribution, we would not expect to find such a pattern since the cost of an efficiency unit of labor would be no higher in Sweden than in the United States.
We have not explored the relation between relative prices and the share of low-skill labor across sectors and can report only glimmers of evidence on this possible relation. Comparative dollar price levels of final expenditures from the OECD show that Sweden has high relative prices in one nontraded goods sector that hires relatively many low-skill workers-restaurants, cafks, and hotels. The comparative dollar price in Sweden is 1.27 times the price of GDP in purchasing power panty terms, while in the United States it is 0.84 (OECD 1990, (OECD 1989b) . To the extent that high collectively bargained wages for low-skill workers are passed on to Swedish consumers in the form of high prices, the consumers are "indirectly" subsidizing those workers.
Finally, and more speculatively, consider the possible effect of the compression of hours worked in Sweden on the demand for less-able workers. Could it be that Sweden has generated demand for less-productive workers by effectively reducing hours worked by more productive substitute workers, creating an implicit system of work sharing? On the supply side, assume that high marginal taxes, the five-week mandated vacation, holiday time, the incentive to call in sick, and parental leave all reduce the hours worked by more able Swedes. This implies that, on the demand side of the market, a firm that would like to hire twenty-six hundred hours from Mr. Able finds that he is willing to work only sixteen hundred hours unless he is paid a substantial premium. If that premium exceeds his value to the firm, the firm will try to get the extra thousand hours from someone else. In effect, the firm faces a shadow cost for an extra hour of a more productive worker far above the hourly wage. What will the firm do? Hire Mr. Less Able to take up the slack. By this argument, Swedish policies that compress wages and provide incentives to work less than the contracted hours have produced massive "work sharing." Raising the shadow price for skilled workers relative to less-skilled workers can, in principle, "undo" the effect of wage compression in reducing demand for the less skilled.
Is there any evidence that creating incentives that limit the hours worked by the more able increases the demand for labor of other workers? What plausibly might happen to the demand for less-able Swedes if, say, the more able worked 30 percent more hours than they currently do (which would give the upper decile of Swedes the same hours worked as in the United States)?
We have not estimated the demand for labor necessary to answer these questions but draw the reader's attention to studies of the trade-off between hours worked and employment, which suggest that, for workers doing similar work, our hypothesis is on the right track. Houpis's (1993) summary of studies of the hours/employment trade-off for the United Kingdom, the United States, Belgium, and Sweden (Pencavel and Holmlund 1988) shows a uniform tradeoff with elasticities that range around 0.7. That is, a 10 percent reduction in hours worked is associated with increases in the number employed of about 7 percent.25 Applied to the entire economy, these estimates suggest that there is a substantial hours/employment trade-off consistent with an "implicit-worksharing" explanation of part of the puzzle identified in figure 1.3 above: how 25. The analyses of Ehrenberg and Schumann (1982) and others of how demand for labor responds to the premium for overtime (which would reduce hours worked) tell a similar story. They show that, if the United States raised its overtime premium from 1.5 to 2 times the base wage, manufacturing employment would increase by 3 percent.
Sweden managed to combine full employment and a narrow wage distribution.26
Conclusion: Consequences of Reforms and Crisis
This paper has documented the great success of the Swedish welfare state in eliminating poverty and reducing inequality and in combining low dispersion in wages and high employment. Our evidence suggests that much of the success in reducing poverty was due to Sweden's tax and transfer systems and that the combination of high employment and low wage inequality was associated with factors that directly or indirectly twisted labor demand in favor of less-skilled workers. We have also advanced an interpretation of the Swedish experience that highlights the compression of hours worked on the demand for less-skilled workers.
The redistribution and elimination of poverty did not come without cost to Sweden. The huge welfare state that developed in the 1970s and 1980s had both a direct cost in terms of high taxes and indirect costs in the form of excess burdens and disincentives (see Aronsson and Walker, chap. 5 in this volume).
As Sweden entered the 1990s, there was widespread opinion among economists that the nation should withdraw from some of its welfare state commitments: the costs of some programs at least seemed to exceed their benefits. The economic crisis and huge budget deficits of the early 1990s also seemed to demand cutbacks in welfare state programs.
How far has Sweden already gone in this "withdrawal from dangerous territory"? What are the consequences for the elimination of poverty? How far can Sweden go in reducing the excesses of the welfare state without seriously threatening the great success of that state in eliminating poverty?
The policy reforms put into place through 1992 do not appear seriously to threaten the country's reduction of poverty. The 1991 tax reform reduced the progressivity of the system but mitigated the effects on lower-income families through higher child allowances and housing allowances. Our table 1.3 showed a sizable rise in inequality (the 90/10 spread) of disposable income from 1990 to 1991 but no increase in relative poverty (the 10/50 spread). The rise in inequality did not continue in 1992 even though factor income inequality became much more unequal owing in large part to increased unemployment.
There have been a substantial number of budget cuts since 1991 that are difficult to describe with a single statistic, and we accordingly discuss only a few, to give the flavor of the ongoing reforms and some of the suggested changes. To help our discussion, we use table 1.10, which gives the distributional profile of three important transfers: sickness benefits, unemployment 26. We also recognize that at some point reductions in hours by at least some of the more able should decrease the demand for the less skilled. Certainly, reductions in the work activity of entrepreneurs or inventors or others whose skills complement those of the less skilled are likely to have adverse effects on the demand for unskilled labor. benefits (unemployment insurance plus cash assistance) and child allowances. The table shows the importance of these transfers in the four quartile groups of the distributions of adjusted disposable income for the adults aged twenty to sixty-four and children through age seventeen on whom we have focused. When the share of income attributable to a given transfer is greater for those with low incomes than for those with high incomes, the transfer reduces relative inequality and lowers relative poverty. Conversely, when the share of income from a transfer is smaller for those with lower incomes than for those with higher incomes, the transfer is regressive. The table shows that, for adults aged twenty to sixty-four, the share of disposable income attributable to sick pay is rather evenly distributed among income classes: the fraction of disposable income for adults is roughly the same in the highest-quartile group as in the lowest-quartile group.27 This presumably 27. The figures in the table exaggerate the amount of sickness benefits relative to disposable income because the benefits are measured gross of taxes when in fact they are taxable.
reflects the widespread use of sickness benefits in Sweden noted earlier. Unemployment benefits constitute a larger proportion of the disposable income of low-income than high-income individuals, but, given the low rate of unemployment in 1990, such benefits are just a minor share of the income of any adult group. The unemployment benefit share of disposable income is likely to be higher for all groups in 1992-94, when unemployment rose sharply, and we would guess that the share would rise more for low-income than high-income individuals, but our data are silent on this point. The most progressive benefits are child allowance benefits, which constitute a much larger proportion of the income of low-quartile than of high-quartile individuals.
The bottom part of the table shows that, for children through age seventeen, all the benefits, including sick pay (for the parents of children), are a considerably higher proportion of disposable income for those from low-income families than for those from higher-income families. Sickness benefits paid to the parents of children in the lowest quartile account for 25 percent of disposable income, compared to 11 percent of disposable income paid to parents whose children are in the highest quartile. Thus, with the exception of sickness benefits for all adults, the transfers in the table are progressive, generally highly so.28
How are these benefit systems changing? What are the likely consequences of change for the distribution of incomes?
The sickness benefit system has undergone several changes. In March 1991, the replacement rate for sickness was reduced from 90 to 65 percent for the first three days, left at 90 percent until the ninetieth day, then reduced to 80 percent thereafter. In 1992, employers were required to pay for the first two weeks of sickness benefits, giving them an incentive to monitor the program. In 1993, a waiting period of one day was introduced so that the worker would also lose something by calling in sick. At this writing, there is discussion of further reductions in the replacement rate to 70 percent or to as low as 50 percent. These changes will reduce the earnings of disabled or sick workers but, according to the calculations in table 1.10, are not likely to change inequality or relative poverty. However, they will redistribute income against children in the lower quartile of the distribution unless reductions in benefits disproportionately increase the work time of low-income parents.
In 1993, benefits to unemployed workers were also reduced. The replacement rate dropped from 90 to 80 percent, and a waiting period of one week 28. These results can be sensitive to the equivalence scales and to the way the scales treat the costs of having additional children. The Swedish scales do not allow for economies of scale for additional children: the cost of an extra child is the same as the cost of the first child. This raises the possibility that the progressivity of the child allowance is due largely to the equivalence scale. To see if this is the case, we computed a version of table 1.10 with an equivalence scale that allows for economies of scale in children by using a square root of the number of people in the family (see Atkinson, Rainwater, and Smeeding 1995) . The child allowance benefits become less progressive with this scale but remain strongly progressive. was introduced. Similarly, the benefits paid in various training and temporary job programs were also lowered modestly. Some policy makers and analysts favor further reductions in replacement rates to 70 or 60 percent. Read conservatively, the figures in table 1.10 suggest that this will increase inequality but may have little effect on relative poverty since the second quartile receives a similar fraction of disposable income in unemployment benefits as the first. However, we are loathe to make any strong statement on this owing to the massive change in unemployment, which could easily affect the distribution of benefits.
By contrast with sickness pay and unemployment benefits, there have been no reductions in child allowances, although some analysts have proposed such. In 1991, in fact, child allowances were raised to counteract the consequences of the tax reform on children with parents in the lower part of the income distribution. As child allowances are the most progressive transfer in table 1.10, they are an extremely well-targeted benefit, helping children from low-income homes much more than those from high-income homes. Reductions in child allowances, and in particular the discontinuation of the progressive part of the benefit, would raise overall inequality and relative poverty, potentially substanti all^.*^ Indeed, the low-income profile of this transfer is so distinct that it is an appealing strategy to raise it, in order to counteract the effects of other reductions in welfare state benefits on the well-being of children. This was, indeed, the strategy in the 1991 tax reform.
Another important set of changes has been the imposition of fees for public services. For instance, the fee for child care has been raised substantially. Local governments, which have been forbidden to raise taxes for several years, have been forced to cut expenditures or raise fees. Again, however, our sense is that these changes are more "tinkering" on the edges rather than a major backing away from the welfare state.
A sanguine reading of the ongoing changes is that, while they may lower the Swedish safety net, that net is so high that it will require something akin to a revolution to endanger Sweden's success in eliminating poverty: Mrs. Thatcher cutting the net with a pair of scissors, not the Economics Commission's 11 3 suggested changes, however one views them. A less sanguine reading of the changes is that over the long run some developments (lower taxes and less statutory vacation time, e.g.) may reduce the twist in labor demand toward the less skilled that tied work, a compressed wage structure, and welfare so closely together in the country. If the 1993 increase in Swedish unemployment marks the beginning of an era of relatively high unemployment, moreover, the welfare state taxes and transfers that have been such an important part of Sweden's way of generating equality and eliminating poverty 29. We note that this result is sensitive to the equivalence scale that we use. While the direction of the effect will be the same with other scales, the magnitude could differ substantively. could become so costly that the country will respond with further reductions in these programs, with far greater effects on income distribution than those that we have documented in this study.
Appendix
The standard approach to analyzing how taxes and transfers affect incomes compares the distribution of income generated by the "market" with the distribution after taxes and transfers-that is, disposable income. In the text, we use the standard concept offactor incomes to reflect market incomes. This concept, however, has some shortcomings that suggest the value of a more detailed picture of how taxes and transfers modify the outcome that the market generates. Accordingly, in this appendix, we examine measures of inequality in various income measures derived from the Income Distribution Surveys (HINK) of Statistics Sweden.
Factor income (faktorinkomst) consists of wages and salaries for employed workers and the equivalent salary for self-employed workers. It also includes income from capital and realized capital gains. It excludes sickness and parental allowances in spite of the fact that these benefits are closely tied to previous work. The basic components of income from work are wages and salaries for employed and self-employed individuals (arbetsinkomst). This includes the closely work-related sickness and parental leave allowances as well as the "stipends" for retraining unemployed workers. Note that these three transfers are taxable. Total income after deductions for deficits in some sources of income (sammanraknad nettoinkomst), finally, consists of total taxable income from all sources of income, like work (including all taxable transfers), income from capital, income from realized capital gains, and income from own estate and own business. It also includes the closely work-related transfers included in retirement pensions that are also related to previous work activity.
Tables lA.l and 1A.2 present measures of dispersion for the three income concepts plus disposable income for selected years from 1975 until 1991. We use the same groups as in the text, namely, adults twenty to sixty-four years old (in table lA.l) and children through age seventeen (in table 1A.2). We also use (as in the main text) the household as the unit of income, the individual as the unit of analysis, and the Swedish equivalence scales.
Factor incomes have the most unequal and erratic pattern. The marked rise in inequality that can be found in factor income is not as dramatic in income from work and total income. This reflects the importance of sickness and parental leave allowances for families in the age groups that we consider. The 1975 1980 1985 1988 1989 1990 1989" 199W 1991" 1992" 1975 1980 1985 1988 1989 1990 1989" 1990" 1991" 1992" 90/10 Ratios detailed tables from the HINK project reveal that these two transfers, which are included in income from work, are higher than income from capital and capital gains, which are included in factor income. In table 1A.3, we look at income from work in a more detailed way; for men, women, and both sexes individually and for families with the individual as the unit of analysis. In the latter case, equivalence scales are applied. The 1975 1980 1985 1988 1989 1990 1989 " 199W 199Ia 1992 1975 1980 1985 1988 1989 1990 1989 " 199P 1991 figures reveal an increase in inequality for men irrespective of the measure of inequality that is used. The opposite pattern is found for women up to 1990. This development for women reflects the shift from part-time to full-time work that took place during the 1980s. Even for women there was, however, a marked increase in inequality from 1990 to 1991. For both sexes together there is also a downward trend in inequality up to 1990, when there was a marked rise. When we use the family as the unit of income and divide the income from work for both spouses by the equivalent number of adults in the family, inequality is remarkably stable from 1975 to 1990. In addition, the 90/10 and 10/50 ratios reveal much more equal distributions for families than for individuals.
Finally, note that tables lA.l and 1A.2 show that disposable income is much more equally distributed than total income. Because the main difference be-tween total income and disposable income is taxes and nontaxable transfers, this illustrates the equalizing effects of these parts of the welfare state.
